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ABSTRACT
NOMINALIZATION AND INTERPRETATION:
A CRITIQUE OF GLOBAL NOMINALIZATION CRITERIA
by
Jason DeWitt
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2019
Under the Supervision of Professor Michael Liston

Nominalization is the process which removes abstract objects from our scientific theories.
But what makes a proposed nominalization a good or successful one? In the paper “Is It
Possible to Nominalize Quantum Mechanics,” Otávio Bueno develops criteria for any
successful nominalization. In the present work, I discuss one of these criteria that I call the
“interpretation criterion.” It claims that a nominalization of a scientific theory should be
neutral with regards to the interpretations of that theory. I argue that the interpretation
criterion is problematic, and that it should be replaced with an alternative criterion of
nominalization. I first explicate the background for understanding Bueno’s goal in
establishing his criteria for nominalization programs and describe the criteria themselves.
Then, I launch my critique against the interpretation criterion by arguing that it makes
nominalization impossible, even when specified in its best form. Lastly, I offer my positive
picture of the appropriate relationship between nominalization and interpretation. The
positive picture is, roughly, that we should not seek global nominalization criteria as Bueno
does, but instead should try to nominalize our scientific theories in a piecemeal fashion.
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I.

Introduction
Nominalization is the process which removes abstract objects from our scientific

theories. But what makes a proposed nominalization a good or successful one? In the paper
“Is It Possible to Nominalize Quantum Mechanics,” Otávio Bueno develops criteria for any
successful nominalization. One of these criteria I will call the “interpretation criterion.” It
claims that a nominalization of a scientific theory should be neutral with regards to the
interpretations of that theory. In this paper, I argue that the interpretation criterion is
problematic, and that it should be replaced with an alternative criterion of nominalization.
In the following section, I explicate the background for understanding Bueno’s goal
in establishing his criteria for nominalization programs and describe the criteria
themselves. In section three, I launch my critique against the interpretation criterion by
arguing that it makes nominalization impossible, even when specified in its best form. In
section four, I offer my positive picture of the appropriate relationship between
nominalization and interpretation. The positive picture is, roughly, that we should not seek
global nominalization criteria as Bueno does, but instead should try to nominalize our
scientific theories in a piecemeal fashion.
II.

Background
In this section, I will briefly describe abstract objects and why one may wish to rid

them from one’s ontology. Then, I will describe the dialectic that starts with the QuinePutnam indispensability argument and ends with Bueno’s nominalization criteria in an
effort to show why Bueno introduced his criteria.
Abstract objects are traditionally characterized as acausal and aspatiotemporal
entities. They occupy one side of the abstracta/concreta distinction, where concrete objects
1

are any objects that are causal and spatiotemporal. Some philosophers dispute the
tenability of this distinction and others disagree with the traditional characterization of
abstract objects as acausal and aspatiotemporal.1 These debates will not be taken up in the
present work. Some candidate abstract objects include possible worlds, propositions,
musical works, and mathematical entities. The abstract objects focused on in this paper are
mathematical entities, like numbers, sets, and vector spaces. Platonists accept abstract
objects into their ontology, nominalists reject them.
Why would one want to reject them? There have been a few reasons put forward to
reject mathematical objects. Firstly, mathematical objects seem to be epistemologically
inaccessible, so we should not countenance them.2 This epistemological argument against
mathematical objects has been made in two forms, but the most developed form (Hartry
Field’s) proceeds in the following way:
1. Mathematicians are reliable, in the sense that for almost every
mathematical sentence S, if mathematicians accept S, then S is true.
2. For a belief in mathematics to be justified, it must at least in principle
be possible to explain the reliability described in Premise 1.
3. If mathematical platonism is true, then this reliability cannot be
explained, even in principle.3
That is, given that mathematical objects are causally isolated from us, the reliability of
mathematicians’ mathematical beliefs is inexplicable. Given this inexplicability, our beliefs
in mathematics are unjustified.4 Since we want to preserve the justification of our beliefs in
mathematics, this epistemological argument is taken as a strike against the platonist view.

For an example of someone who questions the distinction see Lewis (1986), pp. 81-90.
See Benacerraf (1973) and Field (1989).
3 Adapted from Section 3.1. of Linnebo (2018).
4 This, of course, assumes a tight connection between the inexplicability of reliability and a lack of
justification (premise 2 above). I do not necessarily endorse this premise, but I will include
Linnebo’s (2018) defense of it: “If the reliability of some belief formation procedure could not even
1
2

2

Secondly, since abstract objects are acausal “they are causally gratuitous in standard
physical explanations.”5 That is, since abstract objects are acausal and scientific
explanations should be causal, mathematical objects are gratuitous in scientific
explanations. Thirdly, mathematical objects are arbitrary “since units, frames, etc., are
entirely conventional and may vary from one representation to the other, so long as certain
lawlike features remain invariant.”6 Given the arbitrariness of what mathematical objects
we choose to employ in scientific explanation, mathematical objects seem to be doing little
to no explanatory work and therefore do not need to be posited. These second and third
problems are very closely related: because intrinsic, non-arbitrary, causal explanations are
preferable, ceteris paribus, to extrinsic, arbitrary, non-causal ones, nominalist explanations
are preferable to standard ones appealing to mathematical entities. Because of problems
like these many philosophers have viewed abstract objects as worrisome entities to be
rejected if possible. I will not discuss these arguments in any more detail; they are present
merely to provide an understanding of why one may wish to be a nominalist. Now, I will
present what many take to be the best reason to be a platonist in an effort to show the
import of Bueno’s nominalization criteria.
In his 1980 Science without Numbers, Hartry Field began the contemporary
nominalist program in the philosophy of mathematics. His goal was to argue for
nominalism by arguing against what he and many others took to be the strongest argument

in principle be explained, then the procedure would seem to work purely by chance, thus
undercutting any justification we have for the beliefs produced in this way.”
5 Liston (1993), pp. 454.. This is based on Field (1980), pp. 43-46 .
6 Ibid. This is based on Field (1980), pp. 45-46.
3

to the contrary — the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. The Quine-Putnam
indispensability argument states:
1. Our best scientific theories employ mathematical objects indispensably.
2. We should believe in the existence of what our best scientific theories employ
indispensably.
3. Therefore, we should believe that mathematical objects exist.7
Field argued for nominalism by rejecting premise 1. He attempted to show that
mathematical objects are dispensable in science by providing a nominalization of science.
To begin the process of nominalizing the whole of science, and to show that such a task is
possible, he successfully nominalized one part of classical mechanics: Newtonian
Gravitation Theory.8
It might be useful at this point, to offer a quick example of nominalization so that the
reader may more fully understand what Field partially accomplished with regards to
classical mechanics. Take a scientific theory that references the real numbers when
describing the distances between physical objects. A nominalization will get rid of the real
numbers in the distance-talk by employing (as Field does) Hilbert’s synthetic (axiomatic,
coordinate-free) geometry. Taking point, betweeness, and congruence as primitive relations,
one can build a geometry that allows one to state, without real numbers, all the distance
relations one could state using real numbers. Hence, once this sort of nominalization is

See Quine (1948) and Putnam (1975).
Specifically, Field nominalized Newtonian Gravitation Theory as presented in the Poisson
Equation.
7
8
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accomplished one can make a scientific theory that does the same scientific work as the
former without the need to quantify over real numbers.9
Soon after the publication of Science without Numbers, however, David Malament
objected to Field’s project by claiming, among other things, that Field’s nominalist strategy
could not be extended to quantum mechanics (hereafter QM) because of the nature of QM
and its fundamental mathematical framework — the Hilbert space. As Malament writes:
Quantum mechanics is even a more recalcitrant example than Hamiltonian
mechanics. Here I do not really see how Field can get started at all. I suppose
one can think of a theory as determining a set of models — each a Hilbert
space. But what form would the recovery (i.e., representation) theorem take?
The only possibility that comes to mind is a theorem of the sort sought by
Jauch, Piron, et al. They start with “propositions” (or “eventualities”) and
lattice-theoretic relations as primitive, and then seek to prove that the lattice
of propositions is necessarily isomorphic to the lattice of subspaces of some
Hilbert space. But of course no theorem of this sort would be of any use to
Field. What could be worse than propositions (or eventualities).10
The Hilbert space is a phase space which provides a distinctive challenge to Field’s
program because the unit vectors represent the possible states (pure states) of a quantum
mechanical system. Malament claimed that Field’s nominalization strategy could not be
extended to QM because Field would have to find some nominalistically acceptable entity
to replace these possibility-related subspaces of the Hilbert space. But the only obvious
things which could be used to accomplish that task are “propositions” or “eventualities,”
which are just as abstract, and thus just as problematic to the nominalist, as mathematical
objects.

The success of a nominalization like this is contingent on a representation theorem being proved.
A representation theorem is a theorem that states all of the abstract structures are isomorphic to
the concrete structures being employed.
10 Malament, (1982): pp. 533-534. Italics are Malament’s.
9
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In 1998, Mark Balaguer developed a partial nominalization of QM taking into
account Malament’s objection. He removed propositions and eventualities and claimed that
“quantum probability statements are about physically real propensities of quantum
systems.”11 He replaced abstract objects in QM with physically real properties —
propensities of, and propensity-relations between, quantum systems. These propensities
are nominalistically acceptable (unlike propositions and eventualities), Balaguer claimed,
just like any other physically real property such as spin, charge, or mass.
This brings us to Bueno’s 2003 paper, “Is It Possible To Nominalize Quantum
Mechanics?” In it, Bueno claims that Balaguer’s proposed nominalization of QM fails
because it faces a dilemma given two criteria for nominalization introduced by Bueno. Here
are those criteria:
(1)A nominalization strategy should be neutral. That is, the nominalistic
version of a theory T’ should not settle issues left open by T. Otherwise,
instead of providing a nominalization of T, we may end up developing a rival
theory T’—if new empirical consequences are obtained from T’. Alternatively,
if no new empirical consequences are obtained, but T’ settles issues that T
leaves open, T’ ends up providing a different interpretation of T, instead of
simply developing a nominalistic version of T (that is, a version of T that does
not presuppose the existence of abstract entities). (2) A nominalization
strategy should be ontologically parsimonious. That is, it should not
presuppose nominalistically unacceptable items.12
Bueno claims that Balaguer’s proposed nominalization faces a dilemma. It either
presupposes entities which some interpretations of QM would deny or at least not
presuppose, (specifically, Bueno has in mind: Bohmian mechanics, van Fraassen’s modal
interpretation, and hidden variables views), or it does not presuppose entities that these

11
12

Balaguer, (1998): pp. 120.
Bueno, (2003): pp. 1425. Italics are Bueno’s.
6

interpretations would deny.13 As it stands, Balaguer’s nominalization does presuppose
entities which these interpretations would reject, because each of them explains the
probabilistic nature of QM in a way that differs from relying on physically real propensities
being the explanantia. Since Balaguer’s nominalization makes these illegitimate
presuppositions and commitments with regards to these interpretations, it fails to “capture
the underdetermination of interpretations typical of QM” and it will therefore be a new
interpretation of QM, and not merely a nominalistic version of QM. That is, Balaguer’s
nominalization fails the interpretation criterion. Moreover, according to Bueno, in order for
Balaguer’s nominalization to be made neutral with regards to these interpretations,
Balaguer would have to find some concrete counterpart other than physically real
propensities to do the nominalizing work; and what could those be? Bueno’s point is that
Balaguer cannot make a nominalization that is interpretatively neutral with respect to all of
these interpretations without invoking something like propositions or eventualities.
Therefore, Balaguer’s proposed nominalization is caught in a dilemma. This is Bueno’s
argument against Balaguer’s nominalization, but let us return to the criteria that support
the argument.14
Notice Bueno’s first criterion comes in two parts. The first part claims that a
nominalization, T’, should not deliver empirical results that differ from the nonnominalized scientific theory, T, that is to be nominalized. This could mean that T’ should

The use of “presupposition” language will become clear in the following section. I’m focusing my
exegesis of Bueno’s interpretation criterion based on his employment of it on Bueno (2003), pp.
1433-1435.
14 I accept the second criterion (the ontologically parsimonious one), so I will not go into further
detail or offer a critique of it.
13
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not offer a new empirical result that T was silent with respect to or it could mean that T’
should not offer an empirical result that contradicts T.15
Either way, this part of the criterion is plausible. This part of the criterion simply
amounts to Field’s claim that the mathematical theory being nominalized must be a
conservative extension of the nominalization. This means that any good nominalization T’ of
any standard platonistic theory T will be such that E is an empirical consequence of T iff the
nominalistic counterpart of E is a consequence of T’.16 When Field nominalized Newtonian
Gravitation Theory, it would have been exceedingly problematic if his nominalization
offered empirical results about gravity that were not already present in classical mechanics
or that contradicted the empirical results of our extended experimentation with classical
mechanics.
However, Bueno’s first criterion also comes with a second part:
[I]f no new empirical consequences are obtained, but T’ settles issues that T
leaves open, T’ ends up providing a different interpretation of T, instead of
simply developing a nominalistic version of T (that is, a version of T that does
not presuppose the existence of abstract entities).17
This second part of this criterion says that the nominalization of a theory must be
interpretively neutral with respect to the original theory, because if not, then the

What do I mean by claiming a nominalization can yield an empirical result? One might think that
nominalizations are (plausibly) a priori or non-empirical endeavors and so a nominalization should
not yield an empirical result. Nominalizations can yield empirical results in the following way: T’
yields all and only the nominalistic counterparts of the empirical consequences of T. The point in
the text is just that T’ should neither yield a nominalistic version of an empirical result not
originally present in the theory nor should T’ yield a nominalistic version of an empirical result that
contradicts T.
16 Field describes the conservative property by saying that mathematics is conservative in that:
“any inference from nominalistic premises to a nominalistic conclusion that can be made with the
help of mathematics could be made (usually more long-windedly) without it.” See Field (1980), pp.
x-xi.
17 Bueno, (2003): pp. 1425. Italics are Bueno’s.
15
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nominalization is a new interpretation of the scientific theory and not merely a
nominalistic version of it. I will call this thesis the interpretation criterion. I think this
criterion is problematic and why I think so will come to light in the following section.
III.

The Interpretation Criterion Asks the Impossible
What does it mean to say that a nominalization of a scientific theory cannot settle

issues that the theory leaves open? Specifically, what does it mean to say that a
nominalization of QM cannot settle issues that QM leaves open? The interpretation
criterion is too underspecified in Bueno’s own work, so in this section, I will briefly identify
some things Bueno cannot mean by the interpretation criterion before identifying the most
charitable way the interpretation criterion can be read.18 I will then argue that this most
charitable specification of the criterion makes nominalization an impossible task, and
therefore it should be replaced with an alternative criterion of nominalization.
If the interpretation criterion is too strong, it rules out nominalization, in the most
obvious way, from the beginning. This is because a theory without abstract objects is
interpretatively different from a theory with abstract objects. If this is what Bueno means
by the interpretation criterion, then nominalization is ruled out from the start. This, of
course, is not what Bueno means given that he wants to accept the possibility of merely
nominalistic versions of theories.
If the interpretation criterion is too weak, then it allows Balaguer’s proposed
nominalization to succeed. But, of course, Bueno developed the criterion to argue against
Balaguer’s nominalization. This is obviously not what Bueno has in mind with the

I’ve already hinted at what I take to be the best reading of Bueno’s criterion in my description of
his dilemma against Balaguer in the previous section. It says a neutral interpretation will not
presuppose any entities other interpretations may deny (or deny the fundamentality of).
18
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interpretation criterion. I include mention of a weak version of the interpretation criterion
here just to show that the most charitable specification of Bueno’s interpretation criterion
must be, in terms of logical strength, between the too strong and too weak versions I have
just offered. Let me now offer what I take to be the most charitable reading of Bueno’s
interpretation criterion.19
I will call the most charitable specification of the interpretation criterion the “core
theory” specification. The core theory specification says that a good nominalization of QM
is one that nominalizes the “core theory” of QM, while remaining silent with respect to all of
the issues that the interpretations of QM disagree about. There are two clarificatory points
which need to be addressed before moving on. One, which interpretations are included in
this specification of the criterion? I think Bueno’s criterion would have to include all of the
currently defensible interpretations of QM (Bohmian mechanics, GRW, Everettian
mechanics, van Fraassen’s modal interpretation, etc.) for the criterion to do the work it is
intended to do against Balaguer. Two, what is this core theory? The core theory (hereafter
Q) is the minimally interpreted shared core of QM. It has as its parts some postulates, and a
minimal interpretation of those postulates that assigns them a physical world meaning.20 Q

There are also a few other uncharitable specifications of the interpretation criterion in the logical
space that will not be discussed in the body of the work. For example, one possible specification of
the criterion says a nominalization should be interpretation-free. But, this specification is also
obviously faulty given the definitions of theory on either the syntactic or semantic views of theory
structure: a scientific theory on either conception must include an interpretive element.
20 The standard textbook statement of Q is that Q is a set of the following 4 statements:
1. Every physical system is associated with a Hilbert Space, every unit vector in the space
corresponds to a possible pure state of the system, and every possible pure state, to some
vector in the space.
2. Hermitian operators in the Hilbert space associated with a system represent physical
quantities, and their eigenvalues represent the possible results of measurements of those
quantities.
19
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would have to, minimally, say something about the probabilistic structures of quantum
events (since Q is partially represented by the platonistic Hilbert space). Let Qin represent
the currently defensible interpretations of QM (for example, Qi1 could represent the
Bohmian interpretation, Qi2 could represent the modal interpretation, etc.). Each Qin
extends Q in different ways for each interpretation; that is, each Qin embeds Q in a richer
world with more mathematical formalism and physical interpretation of that formalism
than what is present in Q. Suppose now that we can nominalize Q as a theory, QN, such that
for any nominalistic sentence ϕ: if (QN+M) ⊢ ϕ then QN ⊢ ϕ (where M is the original
mathematics present in Q). Then, Bueno’s criterion (under this best specification I am
offering) claims that QN must be compatible with every Qin (except for not having the
mathematical consequences of the latter) in the following sense: QN must not presuppose
any entities that any Qin would deny. And since Q must say something about the eventprobabilities of quantum systems, QN must tell a story about event-probabilities of
quantum systems in a way that does not presuppose any entities any Qin may deny.21

3. The Hilbert space associated with a complex system is the tensor product of those
associated with the simple systems (in the standard, non-relativistic, theory: the individual
particles of which it is composed).
4. Given the state of a system at t and the forces and constraints to which it is subject, there is
an equation, Schrödinger's equation, that (deterministically) gives the state at any other
time U|vt> → |vt′>.
Some interpretations share a 5th statement:
5. Collapse postulate: Carrying out a "measurement" of an observable B on a system in a state
|A> has the effect of collapsing the system into a B-eigenstate corresponding to the
eigenvalue observed.
I take this formulation of the statements almost exactly from Ismael’s “Quantum Mechanics,”
(2015).
Not every currently defensible interpretation of QM will agree with all of these statements as
explicitly stated, but most do, and all of them agree with most of it.
21 What do I mean by “event-probabilities”? I mean probabilities that a quantum system will be in a
particular state when measured. (The soon-to-be-made point in the main text is that some QM
interpretations claim that these are fundamental features of the world and other interpretations
11

Balaguer’s nominalization fails, according to Bueno, because the things it introduces
to nominalize Q (that is, to solve Malament’s worry), propensities, are posits that several
other QM interpretations would deny the existence of. That is, Balaguer’s QN introduces a
thing that some Qin’s do not presuppose. More precisely, according to Bueno, Balaguer’s
nominalization fails because it introduces propensities as the things which nominalistically
underwrite the probabilistic structure of QM, but Bohmian mechanics, the modal
interpretation, and hidden variables views each deal with the probabilistic structure of QM
in ways that deny that propensities exist or do the fundamental work Balaguer claims they
do. That is, these interpretations do not presuppose the existence of real propensities in
nature. So, putting the pieces together, the best reading of Bueno’s criterion claims that a
good nominalization of QM is a nominalization which nominalizes the core of QM by
explaining the event-probabilities in QM (recovering the Hilbert space in nominalistically
acceptable terms) without introducing things that other interpretations would deny the
existence of. A good QN is one that nominalizes Q without introducing entities any Qin
would not presuppose.
Now I’d like to introduce a dilemma for the core theory specification. Either there is
a core theory or there is not. If there is a core theory, then it would, as mentioned above,
minimally, need to capture the event-probabilities of quantum states. So, QN must give a
story about the event-probabilities of quantum events in Q without presupposing entities
that any Qin would question.

will explain them away by saying, for one example, that event-probabilities are merely epistemic as
opposed to being physically real).
12

The problem, however, is this: each of the Qin’s either accept that there are
fundamental event-probabilities in the world or they do not accept this. The
interpretations that accept fundamental event-probabilities in the world presuppose some
entities that the opposing interpretations would deny — namely, fundamental eventprobabilities. The interpretations that deny the existence of fundamental eventprobabilities deny the fundamental existence of event-probabilities by introducing further
entities. For example, take Bohmian mechanics. Bohmian mechanics claims that the
probabilistic nature of QM is merely epistemic. The reality is there is a guiding field or pilot
wave which explains away the probabilistic nature of quantum events; there are no
fundamental probabilities in nature. For another example, take Everettian mechanics.
Everettian mechanics posits that we live in a multiverse and it is the multitude of universes
that ground the probabilistic events in QM. It is not the case, for Everett or Bohm (or
perhaps, for other QM interpretations) that event-probabilities are a fundamental feature
of the world. At most, event-probabilities are features of the world on these interpretations
only because they “fall out”, or are results of the more fundamental wave function.
Therefore, Bueno’s interpretation criterion is asking for something that cannot be
achieved (at least with regards to QM). It is asking, on this best specification, for a
nominalization of a theory that gives a story about QM event-probabilities consistent with
every interpretation. However, this nominalization would either have to accept or deny
that fundamental event-probabilities exist (because it must give some story about eventprobabilities). To accept fundamental event-probabilities would be a failure of neutrality
with respect to some interpretations (Bohm’s and Everett’s, for example). On the other
hand, denying fundamental event-probabilities would require introducing controversial
13

entities (as when Bohmian mechanics introduces a pilot wave to explain away the seeming
fundamentality of event-probabilities). Any seemingly successful nominalization will
explain event-probabilities in a nominalistically acceptable fashion, but recall: any
nominalization which introduces a thing into the world that other interpretations do not
presuppose makes that seemingly successful nominalization fail. Some interpretations
deny that nature is fundamentally probabilistic by presupposing further entities and others
accept that nature has fundamental event-probabilities, and therefore, nominalization is an
impossible task on this specification of the interpretation criterion.
Eddy Chen makes a similar point when criticizing Balaguer specifically. He claims
that “realist” interpretations (like Bohmian mechanics, GRW spontaneous collapse theories,
and Everettian mechanics that “involve the quantum states as represented by a wave
function, and not a function from events to probabilities”)22 cannot endorse the existence of
event-probabilities as fundamental. Chen’s nominalization, since it crucially relies on wavefunction realism itself, would also fail Bueno’s interpretation criterion as Chen’s
nominalization presupposes the existence of a real wave-function in the world (something
that interpretations like van Fraassen’s modal interpretation would deny).23
Continuing the dilemma, suppose instead that there is no core Q. There are reasons
to think this. Firstly, different interpretations differ in their formal features. For example,
Bohmian mechanics contains an added formalism for the pilot wave and GRW adds a
distinctly changed Schrödinger equation. And an addition of formalism is not merely a

Chen (forthcoming).
However Chen’s nominalization is an example of a good nominalization effort on my own positive
view offered in the next section, as he simply endeavors to nominalize the class of wave-functional
realist interpretations and not the whole of QM.
22
23

14

difference in interpretation; it is a difference in theory. This is because on either of the
dominant views of the structure of scientific theories, the syntactic or semantic views, a
substantive difference in formalism would result in a different set of sentences that
constitute the theory on the syntactic view or that characterize the models that constitute
the theory on the semantic view. You cannot have an addition of formalism without a
difference of theory on either of these major views of scientific theory structure.
Secondly, the different interpretations have different pictures of the concrete world
and seem more akin to different (rival) theories than to different interpretations of one
theory that represents part of a single world. For examples, Bohmian mechanics adds a
concrete pilot wave to the world, and Everettian mechanics adds a concrete multiverse. If
these interpretations have such a different picture of the concrete, physical world, why
think they are mere interpretations of one theory, and not theories in their own right? As
Myrvold writes:
Two of the major approaches [“interpretations”], hidden-variables
[“interpretations”] and collapse [“interpretations], involve formulation of
physical theories distinct from standard quantum mechanics; this renders
the terminology of “interpretation” even more inappropriate.24
For these two reasons, we should not even expect a common core theory of QM.25
If there is no Q, then, at best, classes of QM have a common core. The most Bueno can
say with his criterion, then, is that a nominalization works (or does not work) for a
particular class of interpretations. If there is no core theory, then no global, general
criterion for the nominalization of QM, like Bueno’s, is available. Just because a given

Myrvold (2016), sec. 1.
Tim Maudlin agrees. He claims there is no quantum theory, instead only a “quantum recipe”
throughout his (2019) book.
24
25
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nominalization does not work for a particular class of QM interpretations, nothing follows
for the nominalizations of another class.
To summarize this section: Bueno’s interpretation criterion is underspecified in his
own work. But, the most charitable specification of the criterion in logical space says that a
nominalization of QM is good if it nominalizes core QM, and is silent with respect to the
issues that the different interpretations disagree about. However, there are reasons to
doubt the existence of this core theory, and if a core theory does not exist, then the
interpretation criterion makes nominalization impossible. But, even if there is a core theory
of QM, then a nominalization of the core theory would have to, minimally, tell a story about
the event-probabilities in QM. However, that story would either invole an acceptance of
fundamental event-probabilities or a rejection of them. If it involves an acceptance of them,
then the proposed nominalization fails to be neutral with regards to interpretations like
Bohmian mechanics and Everettian mechanics. If the nominalization rejects fundamental
event-probabilities, then it should do so by invoking some further entities, in which case it
then fails the interpretation criterion with regards to other interpretations that do not
presuppose the entities invoked to explain away event-probabilities. Therefore, the best
specification of Bueno’s interpretation criterion asks the nominalist to accomplish an
impossible task. Perhaps this would not prove to be a strike against Bueno’s interpretation
criterion if Bueno was a platonist, but Bueno himself is a nominalist who wants to engage
meaningfully with proposed nominalizations.26

I take it Bueno does not want to say Balaguer’s nominalization fails because nominalization is
impossible. Rather, Bueno seems to think that Balaguer’s nominalization is simply not a successful
instance of nominalization.
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We can, however, nominalize classes of interpretations. In fact, Balaguer’s proposed
nominalization is proof. So, instead of employing a global criterion as Bueno does, I think
we should seek a much more piecemeal approach to nominalization. But what sort of view
should we replace Bueno’s with that would govern piecemeal nominalization? In the next
section, I offer a positive view on the relationship between interpretation and
nominalization.
IV.

The Positive Picture
I think Bueno has been looking at the relation between nominalization and

interpretation in the wrong way. Instead of viewing a nominalization that is
interpretatively neutral as the valuable sort of nominalization, I think that if nominalization
is of any value, then it applies to all scientific theories and interpretations in the following
sense: if we consider any scientific theory T (or interpretation I), and its nominalistic
counterpart, NT (NI), provided it has one, then NT (NI) is, ceteris paribus, preferable to T
(I).27 This is because NT (NI) does the same scientific work as T (I) and has the further
theoretical value of ontological simplicity.
Of course, most nominalized theories are much more ontologically simple than their
abstract counterparts because they drop abstract entities. But this gain in ontological
parsimony is procured at the cost of a less parsimonious ideology. For example, in our
example of nominalizing distance relations, the nominalist must posit a few primitive

Why ceteris paribus? If two interpretations or theories, one platonistic and one nominalistic, are
equal with respect to all of the theoretical values except ontological simplicity, then the simpler one
should prevail. If they aren’t equal with respect to all other theoretical values (except for ideological
parsimony, which I discuss in the body), then ontological simplicity alone will likely not give us a
clear theory choice. The theoretical values I’m referring to here are Quine’s (1955): simplicity,
familiarity, scope, fecundity, conformity to experience, and conservatism.
27
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distance relations to capture all the relations that were captured by use of the real numbers
(in addition to positing some concrete counterparts to the real numbers, in Field’s case:
spacetime points). This picture of the value of nominalization that I am offering, admittedly,
depends on weighing ontological parsimony as more important than ideological
parsimony. However, I’m not sure how controversial this assumption is within this debate.
The Field-style nominalist already apparently shares this assumption, given how
nominalizations, like our distance-nominalization example, are carried out. And
philosophers already unfriendly to robust ideology over robust ontology will simply
disagree with my conditional above — that nominalization is of any value. My picture just is
that if nominalization is of any value it applies to interpretations and theories in the way
detailed here.
For any theory (like QM) that has multiple conflicting interpretations, one would
just have to rank conflicting not-yet-nominalized interpretations in order of
plausibility/defensibility, then try to nominalize each; if the top ranked one has a
nominalistic counterpart, then, ceteris paribus, that would be the best theory (or
interpretation) choice. If not, then matters are more complicated because ontological
simplicity might not trump the other (non-simplicity-related) theoretical values.
For clarity’s sake, let me examine my proposed picture of what makes a good
nominalization of a theory in light of some examples. Let us say we find out that the modal
interpretation (Im) of QM is our best interpretation and the Everettian interpretation (Ie)
is the second best. Instead of seeking a nominalization consistent with both interpretations
of QM (as it seems Bueno wants us to do, and Balaguer seems to attempt), we should seek
nominalizations of both interpretations so that we have a NIm and NIe. NIm is preferable to
18

the original, platonistic Im and NIe is preferable to Ie for reasons of ontological simplicity.
Of the two, NIm is the best interpretation of QM we have full stop, because Im was the best
not-yet-nominalized interpretation and it is also now nominalistic. Instead of thinking a
good nominalization is one that is consistent or neutral with respect to all the
interpretations of a theory, a good nominalization of a theory is the nominalistic variant of
the most successful member of the stock of not-yet-nominalized interpretations.
To summarize these points: Bueno maintains, on the best specification of his
criterion, that a successful nominalization is one that nominalizes the core of a theory
without introducing anything an interpretation of that core would reject or question.
However, given the dilemma developed in the previous section, his criterion makes
nominalization impossible. This shows his criterion is unemployable in any meaningful
way against a proposed nominalization, and it hints at the fact that such a criterion might
have been viewing the relationship between nominalization and interpretation in an
unfruitful way from the beginning. I submit we should, instead, view nominalistic
counterparts of each interpretation of a theory as competing against their platonistic
match. We should rank the plausibility of each not-yet-nominalized interpretation of the
theory, see if they have a nominalistic variant, and if there is a highest ranked
interpretation that also has a nominalistic variant, then we should accept that
interpretation because it is the most successful interpretation simpliciter and it also has the
advantages of ontological simplicity. If our ranking of not-yet-nominalized interpretations
is not so clear, then our theory choice becomes messier, as we may not want to accept the
nominalistic counterpart of the fourth most plausible interpretation of QM just because it is
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nominalistic. That is, instead of trying to nominalize our scientific theories by nominalizing
all of a theory’s interpretations at once, we should instead seek piecemeal nominalization.
V.

Conclusion
Bueno’s interpretation criterion claims that a nominalization of a scientific theory

should be interpretatively neutral with respect to the scientific theory that is being
nominalized. However, I think this criterion faces a crucial problem.
My critique of the criterion asks for the proper specification of it with regards to QM.
The most charitable specification of the criterion asks the nominalist to create a
nominalization that is just of the core theory and does not introduce any entities in
nominalizing the core that any interpretation would not presuppose. This best specification
of the interpretation criterion makes nominalization impossible whether there is a core
theory or not. This is problematic for Bueno’s criterion, because for it to do any meaningful
work against proposed nominalizations, it should not rule out the possibility of
nominalization from the start. If nominalization is impossible on the best reading of
Bueno’s criterion, then this undermines Bueno’s interpretation criterion.
After challenging Bueno’s criterion, I submit that our strategy for nominalizing
needs to be rethought. Bueno thinks we should have a simple set of criteria, global in scope,
that reject or deny whole sets of nominalizations. While I think Balaguer’s proposed
nominalization succeeds to a degree because it works for some interpretations of QM,
Balaguer also seems to want to present a nominalization that is consistent with every, or
almost every, QM interpretation.28 Both dissenters about the possibility of nominalizing QM

28

Balaguer, (1998), pp. 120.
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(like Malament, Bueno, Dummett and Putnam)29 and assenters (Balaguer) all seem to be
pushing for an overextension; they all think that a nominalization should be consistent or
neutral among all, or almost all, of the viable interpretations. Instead, I think we should
look at the process of nominalization by seeking piecemeal nominalizations of our theories.
Hartry Field, to his credit, did conceive of nominalization as a piecemeal project, and I think
we should return to his modest and positive outlook on the nominalization of science.30
This new positive picture I have offered on what counts as a good nominalization of
a theory allows us to proceed with the nominalization of different interpretations of QM,
while we wait for physicists and philosophers of physics to arbitrate among the best
interpretations. When they have chosen a favorite, the nominalists will be there to give
them the best nominalization of QM.

Dummett, (1991). And Putnam (2012), especially pg,194-195.
Steiner (2007) explicitly calls Field’s approach a “piecemeal approach”. Also, Dummett (1991)
rejected Field’s program because of its piecemeal nature.
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